The uneasy relationship of the World Trade Organization and regional trade agreements (RTAs) was thrust into limelight once again as the WTO Cancun ministerial collapsed.
1 The fifth WTO ministerial conference held at Cancun in mid-September 2003 was intended to define more precisely the negotiating parameters for the Doha Development Agenda, the round of negotiations launched at the fourth WTO ministerial conference held in Doha in November 2001. The meeting was terminated following an inability to reach consensus on whether to start negotiations on the so-called Singapore issues -competition, investment, trade facilitation and transparency in government procurement. A decision to start such negotiations at Cancun had been taken at Doha, subject to agreement on modalities at Cancun, but the disagreement at Cancun seemed to involve more fundamental issues than modalities. There was also broad disagreement over the basis for proceeding with negotiations on agricultural issues, which could well have led to a breakdown at Cancun even if the Singapore issues had been dealt with satisfactorily. A meeting at the senior officials level is to be held in Geneva before mid-December "to take the action necessary at that stage to enable use to move towards a successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations". WT/MIN(03)/20. It is generally expected that not much progress will be made, and that the target for concluding negotiations by the end of 2004 will not be met.
their support for an earlier-than-planned creation of an ASEAN common market. 5 Perhaps more significantly, a number of major Asian countries -such as Japan and Korea, as well as China -seem to have recently started pursuing RTAs, something they had not heretofore done. 6 This increase in regionalism and these threats for more RTAs in the near future raise again issues dealing with the relationship of RTAs and the multilateral trading system, a subject that has long been a difficult and controversial one. While RTAs are explicitly permitted subject to certain conditions under WTO/GATT rules, the application of those rules in specific instances has seldom been possible in a definitive manner. As the formation of RTAs has been proliferating at what appears to be a sharply increasing rate, this lack of workable rules has raised ever greater concerns. These concerns are fed by an uncertainty among economists whether the economic effects of RTAs are on balance negative or positive for the WTO/GATT multilateral trading system and a fear that progress in liberalizing trade at the multilateral level may be hindered by the extent to which the attention of trade policy diplomats is monopolized by these numerous agreements and ongoing negotiations. This paper will first outline briefly the history and treatment of RTAs in the WTO/GATT and the views of economists on their effects. It will then consider the NAFTA experience and how that may be relevant for Asia.
I. Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO System
A.
The Evolution of RTAs in the WTO/GATT System
One of the basic obligations in the WTO/GATT system is the most-favorednation principle, which requires that tariff and other trading advantages given to one country must be given unconditionally to all WTO/GATT members. 7 The MFN rule would have precluded regional trading arrangements, a few of which did exist at the time GATT was negotiated. Probably to reflect that fact, the original US proposal for an international trade organization, which ultimately led to GATT, included an exception for customs unions. 8 During the course of the negotiations, the exception for customs unions was broadened so as to include also free trade areas. 9 The basic difference between a customs union and a free trade area is that while both eliminate duties and other barriers to trade amongst members, a customs union also imposes a common commercial policy toward non-members. The North American Free Trade Agreement -NAFTA -is an example of a free trade agreement, while the European Community is an example of a customs union.
The expansion of the Article XXIV exception to include free trade areas meant that it would potentially be used more frequently, as it is much easier to negotiate a free trade area than a customs union since it is not required to create a common commercial policy. However, at the time that the Article XXIV exception was negotiated it is not clear that it was in fact likely to be used extensively. Indeed, only a few regional trading 7 GATT, art. I. 8 A customs union is defined in GATT Article XXIV:8(a) as the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all trade between the constituent members of the union and substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by members of the union to nonmembers. 9 A free trade area is defined in GATT Article XXIV:8(b) as a group of two or more customs territories where duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all trade between the constituent members of the free trade area.
agreements were notified to GATT in the 1940's and 1950's. 10 At the time that GATT was negotiated, regional trade agreements were not particularly controversial. It was easy to view them as a major step in trade liberalization in a world of 40% tariffs.
Moreover, the theoretical concerns of trade diverting versus trade creating effects of such agreements were not explored by Viner until some years after Article XXIV was negotiated.
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According to WTO Secretariat statistics, the proliferation of regional trading agreements did not commence until the 1990's, as the following indicates:
12
RTAs notified 1958-1969  4  1970-1979  16  1980-1989  8  1990-1999  93  2000-2003  30 While the last thirteen years has seen a huge increase in notified RTAs, the number must be put in context. Around one-third of the agreements signed since 1990 were among transition economies that were trying to makeup for preferences foregone with the splintering of COMECON and another third were the result of integration efforts between the transition economies and the European Union.
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Even excluding RTAs related to the transition economies, however, there remains a large increase in formation of RTAs. More significantly, the number of important 10 The GATT Analytical Index (at 858) lists only five agreements that were notified under Article XXIV that came into force prior to 1960. The Benelux customs union predated GATT. The same result is required of free trade areas, where the duties and other regulations of commerce of each of the constituent members of the area are not to be higher or more 21 The application of this requirement has raised some difficulties. Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV specifies that if a member of a customs union, in the process of establishing the common tariff applicable to nonmembers, raises a tariff above its bound rate, then the tariff renegotiation rules of GATT Article XXVIII apply. For example, if four parties to a customs union apply tariffs of 5, 10, 15 and 20 per cent, respectively, to a product before the union and propose a new common tariff of 10 per cent, then renegotiations over breaking the 5 per cent tariff binding would be needed. Paragraph 6 specifies, however, that due account shall be taken of the compensation afforded by the reduction of the corresponding duty in the other members of the customs union. Thus, in the example, the reductions from 15 and 20 per cent to 10 per cent could be viewed as offsetting the increase from 5 to 10 per cent. The 1994 understanding on Article XXIV:6 specifies that there is no obligation on WTO members benefiting overall from tariff reductions occurring on formation of a customs union to compensate members of the union for those benefits. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, para. 2.
restrictive than the corresponding duties and regulations existing in the member prior to formation of the area. A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except where necessary those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and,
(ii) … substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union. 22 The 1994 understanding on Article XXIV:5 specifies the approach to be taken in deciding whether these criteria have been met for a customs union. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, paras. 4-6. 23 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, para. 3. 24 GATT Analytical Index 808-810 (6 th rev. ed. 1995). 25 Although phrased as general definitions, it is understood that paragraph 8 contains obligations that must be complied with. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, para. 1: "[RTAs] to be consistent with Article XXIV, must satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that Article."
The definition of a free trade area is essentially that contained in paragraph (i) above. 26 Over the years, the WTO/GATT system has had considerable difficulty in interpreting these terms. Foremost among the problems have been defining the terms the questions of defining the terms "other restrictive regulations of commerce" and "substantially all trade". For example, are antidumping rules permitted to exist in free trade areas? Is it possible to exclude a significant sector to a substantial degree, such as agriculture, from the coverage of a free trade agreement? Does it matter that there has traditionally been little trade in that sector? The inability to reach consensus on the meaning of these and other terms has made it difficult for the WTO/GATT system to review and oversee the operation of RTAs. After considering the current mechanisms for review of RTAs -the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements and dispute settlement -we will examine these interpretative problems in more detail and consider the status of the Doha negotiations on RTAs, which are one of the subjects of the socalled "rules" negotiations.
Review and oversight of RTAs by WTO Members
Paragraph 7 of Article XXIV requires that parties deciding to enter an RTA must "promptly notify" the WTO of that agreement and make such information available as will enable the WTO to make such reports or recommendations in respect of the RTA as 26 Paragraph 8(b) provides: "A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except where necessary those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories." may be appropriate. 27 In addition, periodic reporting on the operation of RTAs is also required. 28 Traditionally, RTAs notified under GATT were examined by an ad hoc working party established for that purpose. Early on, the WTO changed that procedure through the creation of a Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, whose charge was to examine all RTAs. Unfortunately, because of the consensus requirements for decisions in WTO/GATT and the imprecision in the definition of several key terms for applying the requirements of Article XXIV, the GATT working parties and the new WTO committee have been incapable of reaching any conclusions in respect of RTAs that have been reviewed by them. 29 While hope springs eternal, it is not clear that the situation will soon change, which has raised the question of whether it would be possible to control use of RTAs through dispute settlement.
Review of RTAs in dispute settlement
Prior to the Uruguay Round, there was some uncertainty whether the dispute settlement system could appropriately review the conformity of an RTA with the requirements of Article XXIV. While the issue had been raised, those panel reports where it had been considered had never been adopted. 30 However, paragraph 12 of the 1994 Understanding specifies: 27 The notification requirements are elaborated upon in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, paras. 7-11. 28 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, para. 11. 29 The Czech/Slovak agreement was approved in 1994, but beyond that only a few relatively old agreements were approved. For the GATT record, see the GATT Analytical Index 817 (6 th rev. ed. 1995). The provisions of Article XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free trade areas or interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or free trade area.
While there were some questions raised in the WTO as to whether this language was sufficient to give the dispute settlement system general jurisdiction over claims arising under RTAs, two Appellate Body decisions made clear that this was the way that the above text should be interpreted.
The principal case, which was directly on point, was the Turkey-Textiles case, in which India challenged certain quotas that Turkey had imposed on textile imports from India.
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Turkey's defense was that it was required to impose such quotas as a consequence of its entry into a customs union with the EC. The key issue in the case was whether the Turkish measures could be justified under Article XXIV. The panel found that they could not be so justified. 32 This was confirmed on appeal. As explained by the Appellate Body, Article XXIV does not permit the adoption of GATT-inconsistent measures on formation of a customs union unless the absence of those measures would 31 Turkey -Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, WT/DS34, panel and Appellate Body reports adopted on November 19, 1999. The second case involved an attempt by India to invoke the Article XVIII balance-of-payments exception to defend its comprehensive system of import quotas and controls. The 1994 understanding on balance-of-payments exceptions contained language related to dispute settlement similar to that contained in the 1994 understanding on Article XXIV. Indeed, while the language related to the jurisdiction of dispute settlement in balance-of-payments cases was arguably less clear than that applicable to Article XXIV, the panel and Appellate Body both found that the dispute settlement system could assess the legitimacy of the justification for invocation of the balance of payments exception. At his juncture, it remains to be seen whether the dispute settlement system will become the principal mechanism by which the conformity of RTAs is checked. Given the complex economic issues that would be involved, it would not be an easy task for it to perform, particularly in close cases. The most difficult issues, however, concern the interpretation of the substantive requirements of Article XXIV. 41 Probably the most difficult one is the interpretation of the words "substantially all the trade", as they are used in the definition of customs unions and free trade areas. The two basic approaches to interpreting the requirement that an RTA should cover substantially all the trade between the constituent members are (i) that the requirement is a quantitative one, which is met if the RTA covers actual trade between the parties at an appropriate statistical level (e.g., 90%) and (ii) that the requirement is (or is also) a qualitative one, which is met only if no important economic sector is excluded from the RTA.
There is also some lack of clarity in the requirement that a customs union's constituents impose substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce. In the Turkey -Textiles case, the panel and the Appellate Body seemed to disagree as to how much flexibility this provision provided to members of a customs union. In the view of the Appellate Body a high degree of "sameness" was required. 42 But that requirement obviously is a bit imprecise as a practical matter.
40 TN/RL/W/8, para. 54 (e.g., the harmonization of standards or the introduction of competition rules could raise barriers to trade in terms of paragraph 5 
17.
The Group has substantively progressed in its work. The issueidentification phase has been practically completed, with issues being broadly structured as primarily "procedural" and "systemic". Procedural questions, and in particular "RTAs transparency", were identified as issues for initial consideration and have been tackled since last October, mostly in an informal mode. Systemic issues have been addressed only in formal meetings until now.
18.
After two slow months, discussions in the Group regained momentum at the 11 June meeting, when three formal submissions were tabled. These 43 TN/RL/W/8, paras. 76-77. 44 TN/RL/6. submissions both built upon the progress achieved in informal discussions on "RTAs transparency" and revived the debate on important systemic issues.
19.
Progress achieved on "RTAs transparency" suggests that the Group is heading to a common understanding on the elements to be included in an early package improving inter alia the procedures relating to the timing and content of RTAs notification, and a revived, more transparent and efficient RTA review process. It is difficult at this stage to know whether such a procedural package could be ready before the Cancún Ministerial, but it remains a possible achievement. [It was not achieved.]
20.
A number of systemic issues are now on the table for priority discussion: RTAs and development; RTAs coverage (in particular the definition of "substantially all trade" in GATT Article XXIV:8); other (restrictive) regulations of commerce (in particular matters related to preferential rules of origin and safeguards); and the primacy of the multilateral trading system and possible RTA negative effects on third parties. The Group has also considered the question of "grandfathering" of existing RTAs and retroactive application of any new rules, but it has been generally held that no useful outcome could be achieved on that issue until the negotiations had progressed significantly.
21.
On development, the Group has before it certain RTA-related S & D proposals, referred to it by the Chairman of the General Council on 20 May 2003. The Group held a preliminary discussion of these proposals at its formal meeting of 11 June, and has scheduled a meeting on 21-23 July to further advance its consideration of these proposals.
22.
The Group remains committed to achieving significant results in both the disciplines and procedures related to RTAs. It plans to accelerate work on the clarification and improvement of RTA disciplines under the existing WTO provisions in the post-Cancún period.
The negotiations on RTAs are complicated by the fact that most WTO members are parties to some RTAs and even those members that have traditionally not participated much in RTAs have recently started to do so. As a result, the negotiations may well not produce much in the way of change in the current situation, even if transparency is improved somewhat. That, as noted above, raises the question of how much of a threat are RTAs to the multilateral trading system.
II.

The Effects of Regional Trade Agreements on the Multilateral Trading System
There is considerable controversy over whether RTAs are desirable in general economic terms for the world at large or compatible with the multilateral trading system. consider the other effects of RTAs on the multilateral system. Third, I contrast the relatively desirability of multilateral and regional approaches.
A. The Economic Effects of RTAs
There is much controversy over the economic effects of RTAs on the multilateral trading system. The classic question that has been asked since Viner's classic work on the economics of RTAs is whether such arrangements are trade creating or trade diverting. This is obviously an economic, not a legal, question, and economists have quite differing views on the issue. This diversity of viewpoints arises because of the difficulty of measuring the effects of RTAs. While this might seem to be a straightforward empirical issue, it is more complicated than that. Whether one attempts to measure the effects of an RTA after the fact or predict them in advance, one is always forced to speculate on what would have happened without the RTA in question and that can never be known with any certainty. Accordingly, this section of the paper will only summarize briefly some recent general surveys of economic studies that touch on the basic questions surrounding the economic impact of RTAs.
In a 2001 OECD review, the authors reviewed the economics literature on the effects of RTAs on trade and investment flows. 45 In examining recent ex post studies, the review concludes that results are "mixed". Some studies showed significant increases in intra-bloc trade, but others did not. As to trade diversion, there was no indication found that it is a major problem, although some evidence indicated that it may exist to a limited degree. The review reports that ex post studies on the economic growth effects of RTAs suggest that they "have had little impact on economic growth". 46 The ex ante studies reviewed showed "weak evidence of trade diversion, but that the recent wave of regionalism has been trade creating on a net basis and welfare improving for member countries and trading blocs as a whole". 49 Id., at 58-59.
RTAs. Both of these factors would support findings that the economic effect of RTAs on trade creation may not be as great as might otherwise be expected.
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The conclusion to be drawn by a non-economist would seem to be straightforward.
The overall economic impact of RTAs may not be all that great. Does this mean that the creation of RTAs may not be a major problem for the multilateral trading system? As discussed below, this does not necessarily follow. It is worth underlining, however, that the fact that RTAs may not produce all that much in the way of economic advantage is an important insight that should be given greater attention. It does suggest that too much emphasis may be placed on pursuing regional arrangements when multilateral arrangements would be preferable for all concerned. Of course, RTAs produce more than economic effects on the multilateral trading system, and the next section considers those.
B. Other Effects of RTAs
The WTO Report lists four reasons why RTAs may be inimical to the multilateral trading system. 51 First, it notes the claim that some trade diversion will occur because of the complexity of typical RTA rules of origin. From the non-economic perspective, the complexity of these rules raises compliance costs in the multilateral system. This argument seems irrefutable. It has often been noted that the complexity of administrative rules in RTAs often leads traders to forego benefits under an RTA, such that a significant amount of trade under preferential arrangements does not benefit from available 50 Id., at 59-62. 51 Id., at 65.
preferences.
52
This argument, however, mainly suggests that entry into RTAs, particularly complex networks of RTAs with varying rules of origin, may not make good policy sense. It does not necessarily follow that this complexity will hinder development of the multilateral system. Indeed, the simplicity of the multilateral system is highlighted in comparison.
The second problem raised by the WTO Report concerns transparency. For the most part, this is due to the administrative complexities discussed in the proceeding paragraph. But it is broader than that. To the extent that different RTAs take different approaches to resolving trade issues (e.g., rules on standards, services regulation, etc.), they may significantly the transaction costs to business of engaging in international trade. 53 Divergent rules may not only undermine multilateral rules, they may make multilateral rules more difficult to negotiate in the long run, as each participant may prefer its own rules.
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The third problem seen in the WTO Report is that RTAs may slow down multilateral liberalization because groups in a country desiring liberalization may be largely satisfied with that achieved in RTAs, while those in sectors wanting protection may be able to gain exclusion from the RTA. Thus pressures for multilateral liberalization will be undermined, and opposition will remain as strong. In addition, it is feared that the creation of preferences will inevitably create lobbies for their retention. 52 Id., at 59. . 54 Id. Of course, in some instances RTA rules may end up serving as models for the multilateral system. Id., at 20. Where divergent rules exist, however, they clearly increase the cost of trade.
The fourth concern is a related one -that the negotiation of RTAs will detract from the multilateral negotiations simply because of the limited resources available to many countries.
These last two concerns seem significant. There clearly are limited resources available for trade negotiations. While RTAs often follow basic patterns, they all have to be "customized" to the concerns of the pair of countries involved. That inevitably will detract from multilateral negotiations. While proponents of trade liberalization will presumably remain in favor of multilateral liberalization, there attention and resources will also be diverted. Thus, it would seem that a policy of pursuing multiple RTAs is inevitably going to undermine the multilateral system.
C. The Desirability of RTAs and the Multilateral Trading System Compared
In comparing the effectiveness of RTAs and the multilateral trading system, it is quite noteworthy that the economic benefits of RTAs do not seem to be so clear. While there would seem to be an overall gain, it does not seem to be that significant and may lead to undesirable trade diversion. Since RTAs also undermine the multilateral system in other ways, as noted in the preceding section, it is useful to consider the relative desirability of pursuing a policy of negotiating a network of RTAs as opposed to pushing for more liberalization in the multilateral system.
The recent WTO Report was quite blunt in its conclusions: Regardless of whether regional arrangements seek to pursue goals compatible with multilateralism or to short-circuit the discipline of non-discrimination, RTAs can pose threats to a coherent and active multilateral trading system. A proliferation of ill-considered and partial RTAs could turn fears of shortcomings in the multilateral framework into a self-fulfilling reality. The existence of numerous overlapping arrangements can distort trade, raise transaction costs, and undermine the systemic integrity of multilateralism. Regional trading agreements can strengthen vested interests hostile to non-discriminatory outcomes. They can weaken resolve to make multilateralism work by draining away scarce negotiating resources and reducing the effectiveness of pro-liberalization forces in the domestic economy.
To combat this, without denying the possibility of pursuing regional outcomes, the WTO Report suggests two "ground rules of policy behavior". First, WTO members would be urged "to refrain from engaging in regional commitments that [they] would be unwilling , sooner or later, to extend to a multilateral setting". 56 Second, a consultative system would be established "to map and monitor the timing and conditions attached to the nondiscriminatory, multilateral application of commitments made in regional arrangements". 57 This second proposal would be designed to ensure that the first proposal was given effect. How quickly the regional commitments would have to be multilateralized would be a key issue. Indeed, in respect of tariff commitments, members of a true free trade area with zero tariffs would be expected to remove their tariffs generally, which might well be difficult to get them to agree to. In other words, application of these proposed rules would potentially make RTAs impracticable. Of course, that outcome is not undesired by the WTO Secretariat, but it may be difficult to get WTO members to accept it, and the current negotiations show no sign that this will happen. 56 Id., at 66. In making this suggestion, the Report notes that it would only apply where there is a relevant multilateral framework covering the issue. Thus, commitments on labor rights would not fall within this policy since the WTO does not deal with them, whereas tariff reduction commitments would be covered. 57 Id., at 66.
Whether or not the proposal discussed above could be practically implemented, it is clear that the WTO needs to make it better known that the economic benefits and integration gains from RTAs may not be very great in the typical case and that pursuing such agreements in preference to multilateral trade negotiations may be self-defeating in the long run.
III. The NAFTA Experience and the Lessons for Asia
In the Americas, RTAs have been negotiated over recent years in a rather haphazard and confusing manner. In this section, I will first describe the maze of agreements that is emerging. Thereafter, I will comment on the effects of NAFTA from the perspective of how it has affected trade and how it relates to the multilateral trading system and what lessons it suggests for Asia.
A. The Maze of RTAs in the Americas
In the case of the US, it entered into a free trade area with Canada in 1989, which Mexican GDP during that period. 64 In the case of Canada, exports to the US and Mexico were up 95 per cent in the same period (compared to five per cent for other exports).
Similarly, US exports to NAFTA partners nearly doubled (compared to a 44 per cent increase for others). 65 More significantly, investment in Mexico increased substantially, with a higher percentage coming from the US and Canada. The degree to which this can be attributed to NAFTA is not agreed upon by those that have studied the matter. As noted above, the US economic boon of the 1990s and Mexican peso devaluation probably had bigger impacts, but it is likely that at least some of the increase in trade would not have occurred in the absence of NAFTA.
Interestingly, one of the major concerns at the time that NAFTA was negotiated was that it would have significant trade diversion effects on Central America. 66 Yet it does not seem that it had particularly serious effects on Central America. 67 That region's trade with the United States continued to grow. This may be explained by the fact that the United States continued and somewhat expanded its already existing preferences for Central America and the Caribbean, the fact that NAFTA rules of origin limited the ability of Mexican exporters to fully exploit NAFTA's preferences, and the liberalization that occurred in Central America, including with respect to policies on foreign direct investment.
All of this is consistent with the economic studies cited above that while NAFTA, and other RTAs as well, probably expand trade to some degree, they may not be all that significant.
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The Overall Effect of NAFTA on the Multilateral Trading System
In considering the effects of NAFTA on the multilateral trading system, it is interesting in the first instance to consider the extent that NAFTA enabled its constituent parties to achieve the goals that RTA members typically seek. As noted earlier, 70 these are to achieve economic gains through trade diversion, to gain more assured access to desired markets, to signal a commitment to trade and investment liberalization, to move the trade liberalization agenda forward when it is stalled at the multilateral level, and to achieve specific political goals.
In the case of NAFTA, the economic gains appear to have been small, as discussed above. 71 And they do not appear to have come at the expense of others to any great degree. The desire for better market access was a major factor in the Canadian decision to enter into the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. For the most part, it does not seem that this goal was really achieved. At the time, the Canadian concerns revolved around a resurgence of US protectionism, in large part implemented through antidumping and countervailing duty measures on certain Canadian exports, and, in particular, lumber and agricultural products. States to restrict the use of its trade remedy rules and US-Canadian disputes over lumber and agricultural products have continued. While the Canadians did obtain a system by which administrative decisions in dumping and countervail cases are reviewable before five-person binational panels instead of national courts, it does not seem that that system has served as much a constraint on US administrators for the most part.
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The formation of NAFTA did serve to signal Mexican commitment to more liberal policies, and the increased investment in Mexico that followed NAFTA may be explained by this in significant part. For the United States and Canada, they were more concerned with pushing ahead trade liberalization when GATT negotiations seemed stalled and it is arguable that they succeeded in that. Finally, as to the political aspects, NAFTA probably succeeded in improving US-Mexican relations, compared to where they had been in earlier years.
It is interesting to note, however, that the goals that were achieved seemed to have been more the symbolic or political goals, not the economic ones.
Turning to the issue of how NAFTA has impacted the multilateral system, it is useful to recall the concerns raised earlier. 73 Amongst those problems were that RTAs tend to impede trade because of their diverging rules on trade issues generally and their complex rules of origin -a problem that is exacerbated when there are overlapping 72 There are certainly many examples of changed decisions under the binational panel system, but because the panels apply the relevant national law, in the end it is unlikely that they will effectively constrain national action in the long run. In the case of NAFTA and North America more generally, the first problem -that of complex origin rules and lack of transparency -is a serious one. The NAFTA rules of origin are quite complex and were heavily lobbied such that they protect certain industries as textiles and automobiles. The complexity is heightened by the different and also complex rules that the United States applies to trade with its other neighbors in the Caribbean and Andean areas. As noted above, the complexity of the origin rules is viewed as having limited to some degree the impact of NAFTA as companies are unable to take advantages of lower tariffs.
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The last two problems -undemining support for the multilateral liberalization and wasting scarce trade negotiation resources -are probably true, but I am not sure how significant they are. Even if there has been some impact on overall support for the multilateral system, the United States and its NAFTA partners seem quite interested in pursuing further trade liberalization -both regionally and multilaterally -and they seem to have the resources to pursue negotiations in that direction. In this regard, it is 74 Cadot and de Melo conclude that NAFTA tariff preferences are largely offset by its rules of origin and other administrative compliance costs. They note that this provides an explanation for the weakness of NAFTA's measured impact. since it has the force of the entire WTO membership behind it, while results in NAFTA seem less definitive, particularly when one of the partners is so much stronger than the others.
C. Lessons for Asia
It is difficult to draw very specific lessons for Asia from the NAFTA experience, Fourth, attention should be paid to creating a robust dispute settlement system.
Without one, the limited benefits of an RTA are even less likely to materialize. That also may most easily be accomplished with a broad-based agreement, with a large number of members, since that will add more credibility to the decisions.
In conclusion, RTAs do not seem to yield major economic benefits in practice, tend to complicate the business of international trade through divergent rules and complex rules of origin, and may undermine the multilateral system. If they are inevitable because of political or symbolic reasons, efforts should be made to minimize the use of divergent rules and rules of origin.
